We estimate premium elasticities in a regulated competition market based on a quasi-exogenous premium increase for young adults in Switzerland. We exploit that individuals born before the turn of the year ("treatment group") face a larger increase in premiums than individuals born after the turn of the year ("control group"). We find that the treatment group is 1.5 times more likely to switch their health plan than the control group. Overall, individuals respond to premium increases by choosing more frequently health plans with managed care features, increasing the deductible, and by switching the insurer. Regarding health plan choice, we find an average elasticity of −0.56 with regard to the relative premium difference of any plan to the status quo contract. The elasticity is up to 5 times larger for the treated (−1.03) than for the controls (−0.19). Our results are not driven by health status as measured by health care expenditures and chronic conditions. Rather, our findings suggest that the difference in the premium elasticity is driven by the salience of the premium increase. We argue that this finding is of high relevance for health care policies that aim at fostering health plan competition.
(see Douven, van der Heijden, McGuire, & Schut, 2017) , these results are not directly applicable to most regulated competition markets. Furthermore, the majority of studies considers employer-sponsored insurance. In contrast, we analyze a market with individual health insurance and out-of-pocket premiums that correspond (on average) to the actual costs of the plan. Similar to the marketplaces under the Affordable Care Act, individuals in Switzerland generally pay the full premium of their chosen health plan unless they receive in-kind premium subsidies (see Kaufmann, Schmid, & Boes, 2017) . Moreover, we analyze a regulated competition setting and use register data on an individual level. This has been done previously by Beck (2004) for Switzerland and van Dijk et al. (2008) for the Netherlands, but the variation in the premium was not exogenous. Thus, our first contribution is to examine a quasi-exogenous premium increase in a regulated competition setting.
Our second contribution is related to the observation that consumers often fail to choose the cost-minimizing option in their choice set. In Switzerland, for instance, health plans with midrange deductibles between CHF 500 and CHF 2,000 do not minimize individuals' total expenditure (i.e., premium plus co-payments) in most cases and are thus dominated by health plans with the lowest or highest deductible (CHF 300 and 2,500, respectively). Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that consumers with midrange deductibles could reduce their total expenditures by roughly 12% (or CHF 500) per year by adjusting the deductible level. A more recent strand of the literature describes and examines these inefficient consumer decisions. In the context of health insurance, the analysis is mostly focused on Medicare Part D. There is evidence that consumers are likely not optimizing effectively (Heiss, McFadden, Winter, Wuppermann, & Zhou, 2016) , switch plans infrequently, and search imperfectly (Ho, Hogan, & Morton, 2017) and that switching probabilities decrease in the number of available health plans (Wuppermann, Bauhoff, & Grabka 2014) , the time enrolled in Part (Ketcham, Lucarelli, & Powers, 2015) . 1 Moreover, Frank and Lamiraud (2009) find similar results for Switzerland, suggesting that agents' willingness to switch plans is decreasing in the number of choices offered. Although switching costs may partly explain inertia in these markets, salience provides another potential explanation. Based on car liability insurance, Kiss (2016) provides evidence that salience of the switching opportunity increases switching rates considerably. Likewise, Wuppermann et al. (2014) find evidence that retirees in Germany react less when differences in health plan premiums are less salient. As a second contribution, we therefore show that a disproportional premium change triggers attention which in turn increases the switching probability. In other words, we provide evidence that the premium increase becomes more salient when its size increases, that is, the switching probability is affected by the salience of the premium change.
In our analysis, we exploit two specific features of the premium regulation in the compulsory health insurance in Switzerland. First, young adults aged 19 to 25 face lower (out-of-pocket) premiums than adults aged 26 and older. In other words, young adults pay considerably less for the same health plan than their adult peers. Second, the age class is altered at the beginning of the year during which the individuals turn 26. As a consequence, there is a sharp discontinuity in the annual premium increase for individuals born on either December 31 or January 1. Henceforth, we refer to the group born before and after the turn of the year as treatment and control group, respectively. Thus, we exploit this institutional setting by comparing these two groups and examining their price sensitivity.
For our empirical analysis, we study health insurance register data provided by a large Swiss health insurer. First, we analyze the effect of being in the treatment group on the probability to switch health plans. Our results suggest that an additional increase in the annual premium of CHF 525 (22%) increases the probability to change the health plan by more than nine percentage points or roughly 50% (from a baseline probability of 19%). Second, we analyze health plan choices in more detail based on a conditional logit model. We find that the premium elasticity is up to five times larger for the treatment group (−1.03) compared with the control group (−0.19).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides information on the institutional background in Switzerland and the identification strategy. In Section 3, we explain the data and present descriptive statistics. Section 4 describes the empirical methods and presents and discusses the main results for the analysis of plan switching and plan choice, respectively. Section 5 concludes.
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
Compulsory health insurance in Switzerland is based on principles of regulated competition, that is, health plans and providers compete on price and quality whereas regulation ensures risk solidarity, individual affordability, and accessibility of health plans (see Schmid, Beck, & Kauer, 2017 for a recent overview). Health plans are offered by approximately 60 private insurance companies that are obliged to accept all consumers who wish to enroll regardless of health status, age, gender, and so forth (open enrollment). Similar to the Affordable Care Act Marketplaces, premiums are generally fully born by the individual and are independent of employment. Unlike in the Marketplaces, all contracts between consumers and insurers are on an individual basis, that is, health plans do not cover dependents, and collective contracts are not allowed in compulsory health insurance (Leu, Rutten, Rütschi, & Matter, 2008) . Moreover, each health plan has to offer the same coverage in terms of outpatient and inpatient services, prescription drugs, and so on. However, insurers can offer health plans with several managed care features and health plans may differ in the voluntary deductible. 2 Both the choice of a higher deductible and a managed care plan lead to lower premiums though the premium reductions are subject to regulations. Overall, health plans differ in the health insurer offering the plan, the deductible of the plan, and whether the plan has some managed care features or not. In other words, a health plan is defined as the combination of the health insurer, the deductible, and the managed care features applied. Finally, it is worth noting that health plan premiums are community-rated on a cantonal basis. Nevertheless, premiums may differ between several age classes and among up to three premium regions per canton, that is, only individuals who purchase identical health plans for the same age class and who live in the same premium region face the same premium.
Regarding health plan choices and switching, three features of the compulsory health insurance are particularly important for our analysis. First, all health plans and premiums have to be approved by the Federal Office of Public Health (FOPH). Afterward, all approved health plans and premiums are published by the FOPH, that is, the entire choice set for each individual is observable. This implies, for instance, that we can determine the counterfactual premium for individuals who switched the health plan. Second, the contract period corresponds to the calendar year, and insurers have to announce the change in the plan premiums no later than October 31 of the previous year. In turn, consumers can give notice to change the current health plan (i.e., managed care feature, deductible, and/or insurer) until November 30, that is, all consumers have the annual right to adapt their health plan. 3 As a result, the month of November constitutes the open enrollment period for the next calendar year and is thus independent of the date of birth. Third, the premium for the same health plan differs between "young adults" (19 − 25) and "adults" (26 and older), that is, the latter have to pay considerably more. By regulation, the age class is altered at the beginning of the year during which the individuals turn 26.
Regulation implies that individuals who were born within a few days can face different future premiums for the same health plan. For instance, an individual that turns 26 on December 31 is considered an "adult" and has to pay more for the same health plan than her marginally younger peer who turns 26 one day later, that is, January 1 of the next year. Besides the almost identical age in days, these individuals are likely similar in terms of gender, health status, education, income, switching costs, and so on. In addition, all individuals living in a given region have the same choice set and face the same health plan premiums during the current year. However, they differ substantially in the future premium even though the choice set is the same. Overall, the premium increase experienced by the individuals who were born on December 31 (and before) is thus as good as random. Henceforth, we refer to this group as "treated" whereas individuals who were born on January 1 (and after) are referred to as "controls." In addition, we refer to the year before the treatment group turns 26 as "year zero" whereas the year during which they turn 26 is referred to as "year one."
The implications of this regulation and how we will be able to exploit them are best explained using an example. (a) Consider Agent C, born on January 1, 1985. As of her 26th birthday in 2011, C is grouped into the "adult" age class and starts paying the higher premium. For the previous years, including 2009 and 2010, C is a "young adult" and benefits from a premium discount. (b) Now consider C's marginally older peer, Agent T, who was born one day before, on December 31, 1984. Because T turns 26 in 2010, he will be considered an "adult" starting from January 1, 2010. That is, despite being of virtually the same age, C and T face vastly different premium levels for the same health plan in 2010. (c) In the remainder of the paper, we will refer to the last year where C and T face identical premiums as "year zero" (here: 2009). Note that we will consider the insurance choice made by C and T in the open enrollment period for the year 2010, that is, during November 2009. "Year one" will hence denote the year where T is treated with the change of age class (here: 2010). That is, C and T will belong to the control and treatment group, respectively. 4
In summary, we can exploit that individuals generally have an annual health plan choice, that the choice set is known for all individuals, and that we have two specific groups that face different future health plan premiums.
DATA
We have access to the records of a large Swiss health insurer (CSS Insurance) and its subsidiaries for the years 2006 to 2014 with an annual average of roughly 1 million individuals enrolled in health plans under the compulsory health insurance law. Our data comprise all individuals aged between 23 and 28. For each individual, we have information on the exact date of birth, gender, region of residence, and language. Regarding annual health plan choices, we observe the deductible level, whether the chosen health plan exhibits some managed care features, and whether the health plan additionally provides accident coverage. Note that the latter is a proxy for nonparticipation in the labor market as virtually all employees have to be insured against accidents by their employer. In addition, we observe the so-called insurance carrier, that is, the insurance company within CSS Insurance that offers the plan. 5 For individuals entering and leaving CSS Insurance, we know the preinsurer and the postinsurer, respectively. However, we do not observe the health plan details, that is, chosen deductible and managed care features, for the time before entering and after leaving CSS Insurance. Regarding individuals' health care expenditures, we have annual total expenditures.
We complement our data with the publicly available premium data provided by the FOPH. The so-called "premium archive" consists of almost all available health plans and premiums since 1996 and allows us to impute counterfactua premiums for any given health plan, that is, we are able to determine the counterfactual premium of adults if they were young adults.
Finally, we apply three refinements to obtain our estimation sample (for more details, we refer to Appendix A). First, we exclude 1,187 individuals who are forced to switch their plan at the turn of the year, for example, because the original plan is no longer offered or the individual moves between regions at the turn of the year. Second, we narrow our sample to a 120-day window around the cutoff in order to ensure that all considered individuals belong to the same (school) age cohort to further strengthen the similarity of the control and the treatment group. That is, we exclude individuals born more than 60 days before or after the turn of the year, a total of 91,063 individuals. Third, we have to further reduce our sample as some dates of births are incorrectly recorded. In Switzerland, January 1 is often assigned as day of birth if the exact date is unknown, for example, for individuals that (illegally) immigrated and had no official documents (see Fargahi, (2017) ). 6 These individuals might, however, differ considerably in terms of, for example, health status, income, and education from the general population. As our identification strategy relies on the assumption that all unobserved factors are as good as randomly assigned given birthdays around the turn of the year, we thus drop all individuals born on January 1. To preserve the relative sizes of the treatment and the control group, we additionally drop all individuals born on December 31. Note that dropping these 1,292 observations also mitigates concerns regarding strategic birth timing, for example, reported in Dickert-Conlin and Chandra (1999), LaLumia, Sallee, and Turner, (2015) , and Shigeoka (2015) . In the end, our sample consists of 20,056 treated individuals and 21,927 controls. Note that individuals belong either to the control or to the treatment group. In Section 4, we will draw on data for year zero and one to analyze individual health plan choice behavior during the open enrollment period for year one. For the analysis, we model exactly one choice situation for each individual, that is, we do not use repeated data for our individuals. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics separately for both groups in year zero.
As evident from Table 1 , the two groups are very similar in terms of gender, language, foreign nationality, and the region of residence. Quite obviously, given their young age, both groups are in good health with only around 5% suffering from chronic conditions. In turn, individuals in both groups spent around CHF 2,500 on basic health insurance and CHF 1,500 on health care and less than 40% exceeded their deductible. Despite all similarities, the groups differ in certain characteristics. Most notably in the regional composition, with fewer individuals from the French-speaking part of Switzerland (Region Lemanique) in the treatment group. Moreover, the treated are slightly more likely to choose a managed care plan, a carrier different from CSS, and are more often self-payers. 7 These differences are, however, negligible in economic terms. (1): The market increase is the average premium increase of all offered health plans in a market, where a market is defined by region, age category (in year one), and calendar year. That is, for the control group, it measures the average increase for all "young adult" plans, for the treatment group, it measures the average increase for all "adult" plans. (2): This variable measures the increase of the annual premium for each individual, net of the market increase (see (1)) and unrelated to treatment. (3): This is the difference of the observed premium in year one to the (hypothetical) premium of an individual's year zero plan. The variable is conditional on being observed in year one, that is, it is only measured for stayers and switchers (Controls: N = 19, 504, Treated: N = 16, 879). * p < .10, * * p < .05, * * * p < .01.
To provide additional evidence on the similarity of the two groups, Figures 1 and 2 plot the average health plan choices against day of birth (centered around the turn of the year). There are two observations worth highlighting. First, all means are roughly constant within each group. Second, there are no jumps around zero, that is, members of the treatment group (left of the dashed line) and the control group exhibit comparable health plan choices. Figure 1 shows that around 40% opted for a high deductible level of CHF 1,500 or more, with an equal share choosing a managed care feature. Within the CSS Insurance, CSS is the most popular carrier enrolling around 68% of the sample. Around 43% include accident coverage in their plan. Figure 2 provides more detailed information on deductible levels. Most notably, the standard deductible of CHF 300 is the most popular with approximately half our sample choosing it. To sum up, the descriptive evidence supports our claim that the treatment group and the controls are very similar in terms of observables (see also Figures A1-A4 ). Overall, these similarities provide first evidence for our assumption that the treatment is as good as randomly assigned. 
ANALYSIS OF HEALTH PLAN CHOICE

Premium increase and consumers' response
Despite all similarities, there is one important difference between the treatment group and the controls, namely, the premium in the subsequent year. The current plan exhibits an average annual increase of CHF 170 (7%) and CHF 695 (29%) in the control and treatment group, respectively. Thus, without altering the health plan, treated individuals face on average a much larger increase in their premium than the controls, as shown in Table 1 . However, individuals can respond to changes in the premium by completely leaving CSS Insurance or by switching the health plan. Recall that we define health plan as the combination of health insurance carrier, deductible level, and type of managed care feature. Hence, switching includes increasing or decreasing the deductible level, altering the managed care feature, and switching to another insurance carrier within CSS Insurance. Henceforth, we refer to these two groups as "leavers" and "switchers." Those individuals who keep their current plan are referred to as "stayers." Note that endogeneity of the premium structure should not be an issue. In particular, the high premium level is not determined by switchers but by the older (oldest) age group. Compared with these groups, the overall health costs of young adults are too low and the group size is too small when compared with older cohorts. Regarding any changes, the treatment group is roughly 1.5 times more likely to switch or to leave. More precisely, in the treatment (control) group, 12% (8%) are switchers and 16% (11%) are leavers. Thus, most individuals are stayers although the share of individuals that does not alter the health plan is somewhat smaller in the treatment group compared with the control group. The (unconditional) plan switching and leaving behavior is shown in more detail in Table 2 . Overall, the switchers tend to increase their deductible level, to choose managed care features more often, and to alter their insurance carrier. Note that the premium increase among the treated is lowered by an average of CHF 82 due to this switching behavior (see Table 1 ). 
Model specifications
Although we observe all health plan details in year zero and year one for the stayers and the switchers, we do not observe health plan choices of leavers in year one. Therefore, we conduct two separate analyses to estimate the effect of the exogenous premium increase.
Switching and leaving
We estimate a probit model using the entire treatment and control group with i = 1, … , N individuals to jointly analyze health plan switching and leaving, that is, the overall response to the premium increase. Consequently, the dependent variable, Y i , is zero for all stayers and one for both switchers and leavers. The effect of a premium increase on the switching probability is captured by three variables. First, as our main (price) variable of interest, we include a treatment indicator T i = 1 if the individual belongs to the treatment group and zero otherwise. Second, we add a variable, P i , that measures how the premium of individual i's plan evolves compared with all other plans in the market. This variable captures changes in relative prices unrelated to the premium effect of the treatment. Third, we include the interaction of these two variables, Note. Table shows aggregated health plan switching behavior for four different health plan choices (plan choices: rows) and both the possibilities to keep the current plan and to quit the insurance. High deductibles are CHF 1,500 and higher; switching within managed care and deductible category implies, for instance, the selection of plan with a more restrictive gatekeeping or a further increase of the deductible level.
T i × P i to allow for differing effects by treatment status. We can control for individual-specific heterogeneity using several covariates. The vector X i consists of health measures and socioeconomic factors such as gender and language whereas the vector Z i consists of health plan details in year zero such as the chosen deductible level and managed care option. F i additionally includes insurer, regional, and year fixed effects. Using different sets of these covariates, we estimate
where 0 is the constant, u i is the individual-specific error term, and , , , and are coefficient vectors to the corresponding matrices consisting of the covariates. Φ(·) is the cumulative standard normal distribution function. 8
Health plan choice
As we do not observe health plan choices of leavers, the second part of the analysis focuses on stayers and switchers. Consequently, the population consists of all individuals i = 1, … , N for which we observe health plan choices Y it = j ∈ {1, … , J} in year zero and year one. Again, a plan j is defined as the combination of carrier, deductible, and managed care feature. Our analysis of the individuals' health plan choice is based on the conditional logit model (see McFadden, (1974) ; Abramson et al., (1998) , specifically for health plan choice) that has been applied in a similar context before by, 8 The underlying assumption is that individuals change their health plan if the latent utility from the change exceeds zero, that is, U * i > 0 where
for example, Feldman et al. (1989) , Farley Short and Taylor (1989) , Strombom et al. (2002) , and Atherly et al. (2004) . In particular, we assume that individual i's indirect utility from choosing plan j is given by
where the indirect (expected) utility U ij consists of a measured component V ij and a random component ij . P ij is the price that the individual faces for the plan (see below), Z j is a plan-specific constant capturing the plan characteristics, and and are the corresponding coefficients and vectors of coefficients, respectively. 9 Individuals are assumed to select the plan that offers the highest indirect utility, that is, individual i chooses plan j if U ij > U ik , ∀k ≠ j (see Abramson et al., 1998) . By additionally assuming that ij exhibits a Type 1 extreme value distribution, the probability that individual i chooses plan j is given by
which can be estimated by maximum likelihood. 10 Afterward, we may calculate the premium elasticity for plan j, that is,
and average over all j and i to obtain average elasticities. Table 3 shows marginal effects for selected specifications for the full sample consisting of switchers, leavers, and stayers (the underlying coefficients are printed in Table A1 ). Overall, we find that the probability to change the health plan increases by 8.7 percentage points due to the exogenous premium increase. Compared with the baseline probability of roughly 19% (see Table 2 , control group), this result suggests that the treatment group is about 50% more likely to change their health plan than the control group. Regarding changes in the relative premium (with respect to the market average of roughly CHF 150), we estimate that an increase in the annual premium by 10 Swiss francs more than the average market increases the changing probability by 0.25 percentage points. Note that the marginal effect is smaller for the treatment group than for the control group (right-hand side of Table 3 ) implying that changes in the relative premium are less important in the treatment group. Potential explanations for these findings include transaction costs or salience of the premium increase (see below).
Results and discussions 4.3.1 Switching and leaving
There are two additional findings we would like to highlight. First, the estimates reported in Table 3 are roughly constant across all specifications and, more importantly, the estimates are very close to the overall effect based on raw means as shown in Table 2 . Put differently, the main effects of interest are largely unaffected by the inclusion of covariates, which provides further evidence that the treatment is as good as randomly assigned. We are therefore confident that the variation in health plan premiums is exogenous. Second, compared with earlier findings in the literature, our estimates seem to be very small. In particular, Buchmueller and Feldstein (1997) find that a premium increase of $10 implies a five times higher switching probability. However, Buchmueller and Feldstein, 1997 analyze employer-sponsored health plans where, after changes in the sponsoring scheme, a zero out-of-pocket premium option still existed. Zero-price options are not only very attractive to consumers but the change in relative prices might also have been much more pronounced than in our case (see, e.g., Douven et al., 2017) . In order to further analyze the consumers' response to the exogenous premium increase, we estimate premium elasticities based on the observed health plan choice.
Health plan choice
As we focus on stayers and switchers, the sample shrinks to N = 36, 383 whereof 16,879 individuals are in the treatment group. The price P ij of health plan j for individual i is measured by the difference to the premium paid for the chosen plan in year zero, that is, we assume that individuals compare prices with their status quo premium level. By construction, this 9 Apart from the premium, we do not include individual-specific characteristics in the estimation, as our treatment is likely to be as good as randomly assigned (see Section 3). In addition, including individual-specific characteristics is computationally very intensive due to the large size of the choice set without improving the analysis much. 10 Note that by aggregating the choice probabilities over all individuals and plans, one obtains the "market shares" of plan j in our sample. Note. This table reports estimated marginal effects of probit estimations for the full sample (including leavers) divided into treatment and control group. Treatment status depends on the date of birth relative to the turn of the year, that is, individuals born on December 31 and before are treated, individuals born afterward belong to the control group. "Premium increase, net of market" measures the increase of the annual premium (in CHF 100) for each individual, net of the market increase, and unrelated to treatment. (A market is defined by region, age category (in year one), and calendar year.) The interaction term is treatment × Premium increase, net of market; health measures/socioeconomics include chronic, female, German; Health plan details include managed care plan, deductible level, and hit deductible. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < .10, * * p < .05, * * * p < .01.
price measure also accounts for regional differences in premium levels. Note that the size of the choice set depends on the location of residence, because not all health plans are offered in every region. On average, individuals can choose among 57 health plans, the minimum being 37 whereas the maximum is 78. We established above that the treatment is as good as randomly assigned. Therefore, we do not include individual-specific characteristics in our baseline estimations. The resulting coefficient and elasticity estimates are shown in Panel A of Table 4 along with effects from separate estimations by treatment status in Columns 2 and 3. We find that the premium elasticity is −0.56 in the entire sample, that is, an increase of 1% in the premium difference between plan j and the status quo premium is associated with a 0.56% lower choice probability for plan j. Separate estimations by treatment status, however, reveal that this effect is mainly driven by the treatment group. In fact, the estimated elasticity for the control group is −0.19 and amounts to −1.03 for the treatment group. In other words, treated individuals respond more than five times stronger to an additional 1% increase in the premium difference to last year's premium.
Even though health plan contracts are on an individual basis, the health plan premium is not necessarily paid by the insured individual itself. Families or cohabiting couples often share resources and potentially find it easier to designate one household member who receives and pays the health insurance invoices for each household member. On the one hand, individuals that receive their premium invoices themselves are presumably economically self-reliant. In other words, they are more likely to cover their health insurance premium out of their own means rather than relying on their parents' or spouse's funds. Therefore, we expect a higher price-sensitivity among self-payers. On the other hand, we are most confident that the health plan choice of the subgroup of self-payers reveals their own preferences rather than, say, those of a caring parent. In light of these considerations, we additionally estimate elasticities for the subgroup of self-payers (see Panel B in Table 4 ). Regarding the overall elasticity with respect to the premium difference, we estimate −0.68 that is considerably higher compared with the full sample estimate, that is, self-payers are indeed more price-sensitive. The corresponding elasticity in the treatment group is −1.14, that is, about four times larger than in the control group. Overall, we find very similar patterns in the full sample and the subsample of self-payers.
Recall that the controls and the treated face the same baseline premium structure in year zero and that the price dispersion of the premium level is comparable across both age groups. Yet one group is treated with a large premium increase and, as a result, responds much stronger to premium differences across plans. These findings suggest that the treated reacts stronger to price dispersion than the controls. There are, however, two potential explanations for the stronger reaction of the treatment group compared with the control group, namely, switching costs and increased salience of the price increase. First, the presence of switching costs implies that switching occurs only if the benefits exceed the costs of switching. Given that the premium increase is larger in the treatment group, the likelihood that the benefits exceed the costs is also higher which in turn could lead to a stronger response of the treated. However, the search and switching costs are very small in Switzerland, especially for young individuals (Laske-Aldershof et al., 2004) . 11 Therefore, switching costs are unlikely to drive the observed difference in behavior.
Second, treated individuals might be more aware of the premium increase because it is much larger than in the control group. In other words, the premium difference might be more salient for the treatment group. Increased salience would imply that the group for which a given price increase becomes more salient responds more strongly to that price increase compared with a group for which the same price increase is less salient. A disproportional, and thus salient, price jump makes individuals more aware of their own-plan premium increase and likely increases the awareness to cross-plan premium differences. The findings discussed in this section suggest that this increased salience then makes individuals more likely to reoptimize their health plan choice, which is illustrated by the much larger elasticity. A potential channel explaining the result is (in)attention of individuals: Consider individuals that are rational but have limited attention. That is, each period, they are attentive to a recurring choice problem only with some probability. Because they do not optimize during inattentive periods, their choice is not always utility-maximizing. However, an extraordinarily large and thus salient premium increase triggers attention and makes agents more likely to reoptimize. 12 In summary, we find that the treatment group responds much stronger to the premium increase compared with the control group and this effect is most likely driven by the salience of the premium hike.
11 Insurance coverage is standardized, all premiums are publicly available in a comprehensive list and there exists a popular and easy-to-use price comparison website. Besides, the actual switching process mainly consists of filling out a standardized form. 12 A second potential channel is that the treatment makes the premium difference become a more salient attribute of a choice situation, in line with the definition of Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2013) . According to this theory, consumers that are "salient thinkers" assign a larger utility weight to salient attributes of a product, where an attribute of a product is more salient if it deviates more from the reference good. In our setting, the status quo plan could pose as the reference good and hence a disproportionate premium increase, as experienced by the treatment group, increases the salience of the attribute "premium." We consider this alternative explanation to be less likely, however, as the estimated preference parameters do not support the notion of an increased utility weight for the salient attribute (see the second row in Table 4 ).
CONCLUSION
This paper exploits quasi-exogenous variation in health insurance premiums to study health plan choices and premium elasticities of young adults in a regulated competition setting. Individuals' health plan decisions are modeled using probit and conditional logit models. Although overall, only relatively few individuals switch their health plan, we find that a large price jump increases the switching probability by roughly 50%. For our treatment group, we find a premium elasticity of up to five times the magnitude of the control group. 13 Possible explanations for these results include switching costs and salience of the price change. We argue that switching costs are of less importance in our setting as we study two very similar groups of young and healthy individuals in Switzerland where switching costs are found to be generally low. Regarding salience, on the other hand, we argue that the switching behavior of the treatment group is much more pronounced due to the size of the premium increase. Hence, it is likely that the sheer size of the premium increase amplifies the salience of the choice decision and thus attracts (scarce) attention to the problem of health plan choice. As a result, attentive individuals are more likely to reoptimize their choice and are more aware of the potential savings they could realize by changing one or more features of their current health plan. Therefore, we conclude that a disproportional premium change increases attention, which in turn renders premium differences more salient and induces a more price-sensitive choice behavior. Modeling the attention problem of inattentive consumers in recurring health insurance choice is left for future research, for example, by modeling a separate attention stage (cf. Abaluck & Adams, (2017) ; Heiss et al., 2016) .
Note that we consider a relatively young and healthy population with low switching costs. Our results might be less informative for older and sicker consumers that face higher switching costs and, therefore, respond less strongly to a given premium increase. In fact, Swiss consumers around age 25 are found to have the highest leaving probability (Beck, Käser, & von Wyl, (2013) ; Dormont, Geoffard, & Lamiraud, 2009) . In that regard, our estimates have to be interpreted as an upper bound for the premium elasticity in Switzerland. Finally, it is worth noting that parents and health insurers have the potential to influence the consumer's choice. On the one hand, parents may help their children to make better choices and joint decisions could affect the observed health plan premium elasticity. However, we do not observe any systematic difference in the response between self-payers and consumers that do not pay the health plan premium themselves. While suggesting that joint decision making is unlikely to affect treatment effect identification, we cannot fully exclude the possibility that parents influence the consumer decisions in both groups in a similar way. Due to limited data availability, the question of how insurance choices are made within families has to be left for future research. On the other hand, health insurers may try to reduce the leaving probability by offering cheaper health plans within the insurance group but offered by another carrier. However, health insurers have only little incentives to actively approach their young customers as they risk to lose more premium revenues when they nudge customers into low premium carriers than the loss in premium revenue due to the few leavers. Thus, the leaving probability, as well as the switching probability, is unlikely to be affected by insurer actions.
The success of regulated competition crucially depends on sufficiently price-sensitive consumers. Yet smooth premium increases such as those encountered by the control group seem to have little effect on switching behavior. 14 If the policymaker intends to increase switching rates in an environment with low switching costs, our results suggest only one suitable approach to increase premium elasticities, because a repeated increase of premiums by 30% hardly seems desirable. The proposed approach involves increasing the consumer's attention to the health plan choice problem. Namely, this may be achieved by nudging consumers, for instance, by reducing the set of alternatives to mitigate "choice overload" (Wuppermann et al. 2014) , by demanding insurance companies to make price differences more visible (Schmitz & Ziebarth, 2017) or at least to actively inform consumers about the saving potential of alternative health plans.
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